CHAPTER 47

The Motive for Distinctiveness: Identity Construction in a Cultural Context

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Abstract

Existential and evolutionary reasoning converge to suggest that humans in all historical and cultural settings will have an enduring and universal need to distinguish themselves from others and their ingroups from outgroups. European and North American studies suggest that people use a variety of positive and negative strategies to maintain their distinctiveness and that these strategies tend to be intensified when distinctiveness is threatened or undermined. Yet, there appear also to be significant individual and cultural differences in distinctiveness seeking, as evidenced by “need for uniqueness” measures; an important question is to what extent these measures capture true variation in the strength of the underlying need for distinctiveness, as opposed to variation in the perceived value of particular forms of distinctiveness or in the particular ways in which feelings of distinctiveness can be achieved. Research suggests that distinctiveness seeking is not reducible to the effects of other identity motives, such as self-esteem concerns; however, the relationship between motives for distinctiveness and belonging is an important avenue for further research. Given that distinctiveness seeking appears to be a fundamental human need, positive psychologists should focus on trying to channel the effects of this motive into more productive routes (e.g., creativity) rather than harmful ones (e.g., discrimination against outgroups). To the extent that benign and beneficial forms of distinctiveness seeking are available, valued, and encouraged in society, more harmful responses potentially may be reduced.

Keywords: culture, distinctiveness, identity, motivation, uniqueness

I will argue here that human beings in all historical periods and in all cultures have needed, need, and will need to see themselves as distinctive. This need motivates people to differentiate themselves from other individuals and their ingroups from relevant outgroups, and it is implicated in many both positive and negative outcomes for individuals and for their societies.

At first sight, such an argument may seem misguided to many readers. Frequently, it is claimed that distinctiveness seeking is a relatively recent historical phenomenon, arising from the development...
of individualistic cultural values in modern “Western” societies (e.g., Snyder & Fromkin, 1980; Triandis, 1995). According to this account, what seems like a basic psychological need is actually a manifestation of individuals’ internalization of normative cultural values: modern “Western” individuals are like the followers of Brian in the Monty Python film, declaring their uniqueness in order to fit in.

In contrast, I will argue that it is one thing to “value” particular forms of distinctiveness and another thing to have an underlying “motive” or “need” to establish and maintain some sense of what distinguishes oneself from others. For one thing, people are generally aware of their values, whereas they may or may not be aware of their motives. Thus, when an Anglican curate I was interviewing about distinctiveness among members of the clergy declared, “I don’t care if I’m distinctive or not,” he was clearly denying the value of distinctiveness, but his denial also could be interpreted as an attempt to distinguish himself both from the individualistic values of British society and from his perception of my values. Perhaps he needed to be distinctive more than he knew. An important part of my argument will be that there are many ways of being distinctive and that not all of these involve emphasizing one’s difference from others.

Why Should People Need to Be Distinctive?

The fact that certain forms of distinctiveness are positively valued in individualistic cultures explains why many people might “value” these forms of distinctiveness but does not explain why people should “need” distinctiveness—except in the sense that they also may need self-esteem, which would be enhanced by seeing oneself in a way which is culturally valued (e.g., Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). Why, then, should people need to be distinctive?

Vignoles, Chryssochou, and Breakwell (2000) argued that establishing “some” form of distinctiveness is a logical precondition for the existence of a coherent sense of identity in any cultural meaning system. A notable feature of all meaning systems is that concepts are defined in relation to each other, involving a process of differentiation. This was illustrated by Saussure: “If I am to explain to someone the meaning of stream I must tell him about the difference between a stream and a river, a stream and a rivulet, etc.” (cited by Culler, 1976, p. 24). The same principle applies to the concept of oneself. For example, the statement “I am British” clearly implies that I have something in common with others whom I would describe as British, but equally it implies a distinction from those whom I would not describe as British. Without such a distinction, it is not clear how “Britishness” would be a meaningful concept. More generally, I cannot have a meaningful sense of who I am without some sense of distinctiveness from who I am not. This suggests that the need for distinctiveness will be universal—not for any biological reason, but in the sense that distinctiveness seeking will be a necessary feature of the human condition. Thus, the motive for distinctiveness might be described as an “existential need.”

Arguably, distinctiveness seeking may also have some evolutionary basis. Burris and Rempel (2004) propose that there are survival benefits in maintaining at least certain forms of distinctiveness. They argue that three “boundaries” are especially important to human survival. At the most basic level, in common with even the most simple living organisms, individuals differentiate that which is “self” (in the bodily sense) from that which is “non-self”: what is inside one’s skin must be protected, whereas what is outside may be eaten or may be a predator. Second, as social animals, humans differentiate friend from foe (and from food), or ingroups from outgroups: One can generally count on ingroup members not to pose a threat and to help with basic survival needs, whereas this is not true of outgroup members. Third, as animals with a capacity for symbolic representation, humans differentiate “mine” from “not-mine,” using identity markers (places, possessions, etc.) to define their spatial and symbolic territory.

Crucially, both existential and evolutionary arguments suggest that distinctiveness is important in its own right and not solely because it is valued within a particular cultural worldview. Thus, the motive for distinctiveness is separated theoretically from self-esteem concerns. Nevertheless, the distinctiveness motive influences identity construction in concert with other identity motives, including pressures for self-esteem, continuity, meaning, efficacy, and belonging (Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006). Later, I will discuss relationships between distinctiveness and other identity motives.

Evidence for Distinctiveness-Seeking Processes

Studies conducted in Europe and North America have catalogued various ways in which people construct and maintain individual distinctiveness. For example, research participants typically remember
information better if it distinguishes the self from others (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Rogier, 1997), are most likely to mention their more distinctive attributes when asked to describe themselves (McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976), consider their more distinctive attributes as especially self-defining (Turnbull, Miller, & McFarland, 1990; Vignoles et al., 2006), and describe themselves as less similar to others than others are to themselves (Codol, 1987). Similarly, people use a variety of strategies to enhance and protect the distinctiveness of their group identities, including ingroup stereotyping (van Rijswijk, Haslam, & Ellemers, 2006), derogating ingroup imposters and deviants (Jetten, Summerville, Hornsey, & Mewse, 2005; Marques & Páez, 1994), and discriminating against outgroups (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004).

When feelings of distinctiveness are threatened or undermined, people typically report reduced psychological well-being and attempt in various ways to restore distinctiveness. In experimental studies, participants made to feel excessively similar to others report more negative emotions (Fromkin, 1972), are faster to recognize uniqueness-related words as self-descriptive (Markus & Kunda, 1986), show a greater preference for uncommon experiences and scarce information (Fromkin, 1970; Powell, 1974), reduce their physical proximity to others (Snyder & Endelman, 1979), and increase their identification with distinctive groups (Pickett, Silver, & Brewer, 2002; for additional findings, see Lynn & Snyder, 2002). Adolescents in highly “enmeshed” families—where differentiation between family members is impeded—are especially prone to a variety of psychological and social problems, including anxiety, depression, social withdrawal, and aggressive behavior (Barber & Buehler, 1996). When the distinctiveness of a group identity is threatened, group members are more likely to engage in behavioral forms of intergroup differentiation (Jetten et al., 2004) and to condone and practice derogatory behavior toward outgroup members (Maass, Cadini, Guarnieri, & Grasselli, 2003; Ojala & Nesdale, 2004). Similarly, attempts to reduce intergroup conflict by activating a subordinate identity are only successful where subgroup distinctiveness is maintained (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000), and affirming between-group differences can lead to reductions in prejudice (Zárate & Garzá, 2002).

Some have argued that needs for individual and group distinctiveness are separate motives (Spears, Jetten, & Scheepers, 2002). Nevertheless, several strands of research show trade-offs between perceptions of interpersonal and intergroup differentiation, implying that these are alternative means of satisfying the same underlying motive. People describe their ingroups as more heterogeneous and themselves as less stereotypical of their ingroups when the ingroup is larger—enhancing individual distinctiveness when less group distinctiveness is available (Brewer, 1993; Brewer & Weber, 1994). Threats to group distinctiveness can lead to reduced self-stereotyping—again enhancing individual distinctiveness—although only among lower identifiers (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). Conversely, threats to individual distinctiveness can lead to increased identification with distinctive groups and tightening of ingroup boundaries (Brewer & Pickett, 1999; Pickett, Silver, & Brewer, 2002).

Individual Differences in Distinctiveness Seeking

Even if all people need some degree of distinctiveness, it remains likely that individuals may differ in the strength of the distinctiveness motive. Snyder and Fromkin (1977, 1980) developed a Need For Uniqueness (NFU) scale, with factors reflecting lack of concern for the reactions of others, desire not to always follow rules, and willingness to defend one’s beliefs publicly. Although widely used, this measure has been criticized for focusing exclusively on public and socially risky forms of uniqueness. Hence, Lynn and Harris (1997b) developed a shorter measure of Self-Attributed Need for Uniqueness (SANU), in which respondents rate directly how strongly they need to be unique.

Scores on these measures predict affective responses to similarity feedback, signature sizes, unusual word associations, and membership of and identification with relatively distinctive and autonomous groups (Riketta, in press; Snyder & Fromkin, 1977, 1980). Higher scorers show greater creativity (Dollinger, 2003) but also greater cultural estrangement—mediated by perceived discrepancies between personal and societal values (Bernard, Gebauer, & Maio, 2006). High NFU scorers typically show little concern for social acceptance, scoring low on measures of public self-consciousness, social anxiety, and shyness, although it is unknown if these results would generalize to high SANU scorers (reviewed by Lynn & Snyder, 2002).

Many studies have focused on the role of consumer goods and choices as sources of uniqueness. Participants scoring higher in NFU and/or SANU show a greater preference for scarce and customized goods and choices.
products, are more innovative consumers, prefer to shop in more unusual venues, prefer less popular products—if the products in question are visible (reviewed by Lynn & Snyder, 2002), and see the same product as more desirable if it is more expensive (Amaldoss & Jain, 2005). Two groups of researchers have developed measures of individual differences in the pursuit of uniqueness through consumption, which are expected to account for many of these findings (Lynn & Harris, 1997a; Tian, Bearden, & Hunter, 2001; see also Lynn & Harris, 1997b).

Especially interesting is research into responses to advertising. Simonson and Nowlis (2000) found that high NFU scorers were more resistant to advertising tactics when making brand choices, but only when asked to give reasons for their choices. This suggests that NFU may predict conscious, reasoned decision making, perhaps especially when one is accountable to others, but may be less relevant to unconscious, emotional, and private choices. This raises a crucial question about the extent to which people are aware of their distinctiveness needs. Both scales—most obviously the SANU—measure people’s explicit beliefs about their need for distinctiveness, but beliefs about one’s needs may not correspond to one’s actual needs, as noted previously. Arguably, these scales may be measuring the conscious value placed on uniqueness and difference, rather than the respondent’s underlying psychological needs.

Vignoles and Moncaster (2007) created “implicit measures” of individual differences in the strengths of identity motives, adapting the method of Vignoles et al. (2006). According to this method, people with a strong need for distinctiveness should perceive as most central and self-defining those aspects of their identities which they consider to distinguish them most from others; this tendency should be weaker among those with a weaker need for distinctiveness. Hence, within-participant correlations between distinctiveness and perceived centrality ratings of multiple identity aspects can be used to measure individual differences in strength of the distinctiveness motive.

Initial studies show that these implicit measures are unrelated to explicit measures such as NFU and SANU; nevertheless, they show meaningful relationships with several outcomes. Vignoles and Moncaster (2007) found an interaction effect of distinctiveness motivation and British national identification in predictions of national favoritism: Among higher identifiers, the strength of the distinctiveness motive was positively correlated with discrimination against members of a national outgroup. Petavratzi (2004) studied effects of SANU and implicit need for distinctiveness on preferences for more or less distinctive romantic partners. SANU did not predict partner preferences, but the implicit measure did: Participants with lower distinctiveness motivation did not distinguish between more and less distinctive partners in their preferences, but those with higher distinctiveness motivation tended to prefer the more distinctive partners. Although still in its infancy, research into implicit measures of motive strength seems an important avenue for future development.

Distinctiveness Seeking in Historical and Cultural Context

Theorists have suggested that distinctiveness seeking is a recent historical development tied to the rise of individualistic values in Western nations (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980) and that the motive for distinctiveness may be weaker or absent among people living in collectivist cultures (Triandis, 1995). Yet, there is little direct evidence for either claim. Yamaguchi, Kuhlman, and Sugimori (1995) reported somewhat lower mean NFU scores among Japanese and Korean undergraduates compared to Americans, although statistical significance was not tested. Burns and Brady (1992) found significantly lower mean NFU scores among Malaysian than U.S. business students; however, this difference was reflected only on the “lack of concern for others” subscale, suggesting a cultural difference in concern for social acceptance, rather than need for uniqueness per se. Tafarodi, Marshall, and Katsura (2004) found no difference between Japanese and Canadian undergraduates in overall NFU scores, although Japanese participants scored lower on items reflecting “desire to be different.” These findings provide relatively weak evidence for cultural variation in the distinctiveness motive, especially given the concerns raised previously about interpreting self-report measures of distinctiveness seeking. Moreover, claims of cultural and historical specificity seem inconsistent with the existential and evolutionary arguments reviewed previously, which suggested that the distinctiveness motive should be universal.

A possible way out of this theoretical dilemma has been suggested by Vignoles et al. (2000). They proposed that distinctiveness can be constructed in various ways: through difference, separateness, or social position (see Figure 47.1). In psychological research, distinctiveness is usually operationalized as
“difference”—distinctiveness in qualities such as abilities, opinions, personality, and appearance. In contrast, “social position” refers to distinctiveness in one’s place within social relationships, including kinship ties, friendships, roles, and social status. “Separateness” refers to distinctiveness in terms of distance from others, encompassing physical and symbolic boundaries, and feelings of privacy, independence, and isolation. In any given situation, these different “sources of distinctiveness” will be supported best by different cognitions and behaviors: Social position will often be best maintained by conforming to expectations of one’s role, difference by deviating from the same expectations, and separateness by detaching oneself either psychologically or physically from the situation. Hence, Vignoles et al. suggested that distinctiveness may be a necessary goal of identity processes in all cultures but that different sources of distinctiveness will be emphasized in identity depending on cultural beliefs, norms, and values (for a related argument, see Tafarodi et al., 2004). Although all three sources will be detectable within most or all cultural systems, difference and separateness will be emphasized and valued more in individualistic contexts, whereas social position will be emphasized and valued more in collectivistic contexts. Thus, the same underlying motive can lead to different and even opposite cognitions and behaviors according to the cultural context.

Although there has yet to be a systematic cross-cultural test of these predictions, preliminary evidence comes from a “case study” of a particular cultural group. Among a sample of parish priests, Vignoles, Chryssochou, and Breakwell (2002) investigated implications for identity construction and subjective well-being of the three sources of distinctiveness. The priests scored lower in independent self-construal and higher in interdependent self-construal compared with baseline statistics from American, Australian, Japanese, and Korean student samples, suggesting that they shared in a relatively collectivistic cultural meaning system, despite residing in an individualistic nation. Thus, it was predicted that social position would be an especially salient and beneficial form of distinctiveness among these participants. Results showed that each of the three sources of distinctiveness made an independent contribution to the priests’ global concepts of distinctiveness. However, consistent with expectations for a relatively collectivist sample, only social position was emphasized in identity, and this was associated with more positive and less negative affect; difference was not related to identity definition or affect; separateness was unrelated to identity definition and was associated with greater negative and less positive affect.

Theorizing about different forms of distinctiveness may also help to address claims that distinctiveness seeking is a relatively recent cultural phenomenon. With the advance of modernity, individuals increasingly have moved from living in small face-to-face communities to conditions of relative anonymity such as are found in large cities (Simmel, 1903/1950). One might speculate that traditional forms of distinctiveness in terms of social position have become harder to sustain as a result, leading to a shift toward constructing distinctiveness in terms of difference and separateness. Hence, perhaps there has been an historical transition, not in the importance of distinctiveness per se, but in how distinctiveness is typically constructed. In this process, perhaps distinctiveness seeking also has become more “problematic” (after Baumeister, 1987). Whereas in previous cultural systems distinctiveness largely would have been “ascribed” from birth by one’s place in the social order, identities in the modern world are much more flexible and so distinctiveness must be “achieved” by the active efforts of the individual. Thus, even if distinctiveness always has been needed, with modernization one might expect to see an increase in effortful forms of distinctiveness seeking.

Of course, such historical processes are extremely difficult to study empirically. Nevertheless, some idea can be gained from research by Speller, Lyons, and Twigger-Ross (2002) into effects of the enforced relocation of a traditional coal-mining community in the North of England. In this “natural experiment,” villagers were relocated from traditional nineteenth-century terraced housing to new semi-detached housing with front and back gardens. The new housing gave greater privacy to each household, and weakened preexisting patterns of social interaction; moreover, the new village included...
former outsiders as well as members of the original community. Before relocation, villagers appeared to derive a sense of distinctiveness especially from the uniqueness of their community and from their individual social positions within the community. Both of these forms of distinctiveness were harder to sustain in the new environment. However, new signs of differentiation began to emerge, as many villagers increased their separateness by erecting high garden fences and hedges and expressed their differences by personalizing their houses with colorful external decorations. At the same time, villagers shifted toward a more individualistic worldview. Perhaps these changes might be viewed as a micro-cosm of slower but more widespread historical processes.

**Distinctiveness and Other Identity Motives**

I noted previously that the distinctiveness motive influences identity construction in concert with other identity motives, including pressures for self-esteem, continuity, meaning, efficacy, and belonging (Vignoles et al., 2006). The distinctiveness motive is separable theoretically from self-esteem concerns, but is this borne out empirically?

A great deal of research attests to the importance of “positive distinctiveness”—the belief that one is better than others—in self-esteem maintenance (Wills, 1981): People show more confidence in the accuracy of social comparisons which distinguish them positively from others (Schwartz & Smith, 1976), overestimate the uniqueness of their positive attributes (Campbell, 1986), and, especially in situations of threat, prefer to compare themselves with others from whom they are positively distinguished (Hakmiller, 1966). Conversely, people also frequently emphasize their similarity to positively valued others (Wheeler, 1966)—apparently sacrificing distinctiveness for self-esteem.

Nevertheless, distinctiveness seeking is not wholly reducible to self-esteem maintenance. Participants in Vignoles and colleagues’ (2006) studies of motivated identity construction consistently rated as more central and self-defining those aspects of their identities which distinguished them more from others, and these effects persisted when controlling statistically for similar effects of feelings of self-esteem, continuity, belonging, efficacy, and meaning. Brewer, Manzi, and Shaw (1993) studied effects of “depersonalization” among participants categorized into high- and low-status majority and minority groups. Without depersonalization, participants showed a complex pattern of ingroup evaluations consistent with self-esteem maintenance; however, when participants were primed with depersonalizing information—frustrating the distinctiveness motive—participants simply evaluated minority ingroups more positively than majority ingroups regardless of status, now apparently prioritizing distinctiveness over self-esteem.

Especially interesting is the relationship between motives for distinctiveness and belonging. Dominant theories of both individual and group distinctiveness have viewed these motives as fundamentally opposed with each other. Uniqueness theory (Snyder & Frankin, 1980) proposes that degrees of individual similarity to others are encoded at different levels of acceptability, moderate similarity being the most acceptable and very high or very low similarity (i.e., very low or very high distinctiveness) the least acceptable outcomes. In a series of studies, the authors induced feelings of varying levels of similarity in participants, finding convergent evidence for the positive value of moderate distinctiveness across various affective and behavioral outcomes. The preference for moderate over low similarity is explained by the fact that “in many situations, people want not to be unique but to be similar to others” (p. 216).

Similarly, optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991, 2003) proposes that social identity processes are driven by two motivational principles, a need for “differentiation” and a need for “inclusion,” understood to act in opposition to each other. According to this theory, “optimal distinctiveness” occurs at a point of equilibrium between the two needs, which will normally be a state of moderate distinctiveness. Predictions of optimal distinctiveness theory are similar to those of uniqueness theory, but they have been applied especially to questions of group identity finding support in many contexts (reviewed by Brewer, 2003; Vignoles et al., 2000).

Both theories imply that humans are placed in an inevitable state of identity conflict by the opposition of distinctiveness and belonging needs. However, both theories rely on particular constructions of these motives. In uniqueness theory, distinctiveness is understood as difference, which is opposed with similarity. In optimal distinctiveness theory, distinctiveness is operationalized in terms of group size: the larger the group, the more inclusion; the smaller the group, the more differentiation.

When distinctiveness and belonging are operationalized in these ways, empirical support is found for the value of moderate distinctiveness—balancing the two motivational pressures. However, when both
motives are conceptualized more fully, a different picture emerges. Although many constructions of distinctiveness and belonging are opposed—difference with similarity, separation with closeness, and exclusiveness with inclusiveness of group membership—this is by no means inevitable. Constructions of distinctiveness in terms of social position are entirely compatible with belonging needs: Positional distinctiveness actually depends on inclusion within social relationships (Vignoles et al., 2000). Similarly, feelings of belonging may be founded on acceptance by others, which actually tends to support individual distinctiveness (Green & Werner, 1996). Moreover, Hornsey and Jetten (2004) review a multitude of ways in which individuals may use group memberships to maintain their distinctiveness while simultaneously affirming belonging.

Although much research supports the co-presence of motives for distinctiveness and belonging, it is harder to find empirical support for their “fundamental opposition.” Indeed, some research into optimal distinctiveness theory has shown that identical coping strategies can be used to compensate for threats to distinctiveness or to belonging (e.g., Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 2002), which would not be the case if increases in distinctiveness automatically lowered belonging, and vice versa. Nor do more distinctive identity aspects necessarily provide less belonging; across four studies reported by Vignoles et al. (2006), ratings of identity aspects for satisfaction of these two motives showed correlations from .03 to .36. Thus, feelings of distinctiveness and belonging appear to be independent, or even positively related.

Unpublished analyses of these data show considerable individual variation in the congruence or opposition of motives for distinctiveness and belonging. In one study within-participant correlations between distinctiveness and belonging ratings ranged from −1.00, suggesting a perfect opposition between the two motives, to +.97, suggesting almost perfect congruence; interestingly, individuals showing greater opposition between the two motives tended to report slightly lower subjective well-being. In another study, individuals showing greater opposition between the two motives tended to score higher on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Although exploratory, these findings suggest that those who manage to resolve the potential conflict between distinctiveness and belonging may achieve better psychological adjustment.

Distinctiveness Seeking and Positive Psychology

Lynn and Snyder (2002) proposed that uniqueness seeking is beneficial for the individual and for society, despite the negative connotations of terms such as “deviant” and “abnormal” often used to describe those who differentiate themselves from the majority. Apart from the implications for individual psychological welfare, they proposed that valuing and seeking distinctiveness also has two important social benefits. First, the more people value and pursue different interests and goals, the less competition and conflict there will be for success on a limited range of dimensions, and hence the more likely that every individual can succeed in something valued within society. Second, the more diversity within a society, the greater the range of human resources will be available for it to adapt and survive in the face of difficulties. Hence, they called for greater social acceptance of human differences.

Certainly, the validity and importance of these arguments remain undiminished. Nevertheless, it seems important also to acknowledge that not all distinctiveness seeking has beneficial consequences for the individual or for society. Distinctiveness seeking sometimes can be associated with cultural estrangement, disregard for the feelings of others, and even prejudice and discrimination. Yet, attempts to alleviate such problems by blocking distinctiveness seeking, or denying diversity, are often counterproductive, leading to greater defensiveness and fuelling intergroup conflict. Hence, what seems important is not to encourage or discourage differentiation per se, but to try to channel distinctiveness seeking into productive rather than damaging routes. To the extent that benign and beneficial forms of distinctiveness seeking are available, valued, and encouraged in society, more harmful distinctiveness seeking responses may potentially be reduced.

In one respect, research now offers a considerably more optimistic message than previous thinking about distinctiveness seeking. Whereas previous theories (Brewer, 1991; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980) have typically portrayed distinctiveness and belonging motives as fundamentally opposed, placing individuals in an inevitable position of identity conflict, findings reviewed here suggest that the conflict between distinctiveness and belonging motives is neither fundamental nor inevitable. Seemingly, most people do not experience conflict between these two motives, and those who experience them as compatible experience better psychological well-being.
adjustment. Although more research is needed, perhaps more positive individual and societal outcomes might be achieved by fostering forms of distinctiveness and belonging which are compatible.

Questions for Future Research
1. What are the different processes underlying implicit and explicit measures of distinctiveness seeking?
2. To what extent, and in what sense, is distinctiveness seeking culturally variable?
3. How can one best reconcile the potential conflict between distinctiveness and belonging needs?

References
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Chapter 47

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